Dr. Veysi Dağ: "Reading Kurdish history through Israel is both wrong and dangerous"
RastinewsIn 2024, following a call by MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli and its acceptance by Abdullah Öcalan, a process began based on the PKK's dissolution. The process has met with varying responses within Kurdish public opinion: alongside supporters, there are also broad segments that approach it critically and with suspicion.
Kurdish academic Veysi Dağ is among those on the critical side of this debate. Stating that he supports peace processes in principle, Dağ describes the process being conducted between Turkey and Öcalan as a "pseudo-peace," arguing that the real issue is not the PKK's disarmament but the Kurds' position as an independent political actor in the Middle East.
As Rastî, we spoke with Dağ about how criticism of the process has been received, the current stance of Kurdish political actors, and the recently emerging debates over "proto-Israel," "post-Israel," and Zionism. According to Dağ, who says regional powers' policies must be judged by the same standards, the Kurds' future should be defined by their own political will, not by the geopolitical narratives of other actors.
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In 2024, a process began based on the PKK's dissolution, following a call by MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli and its acceptance by Abdullah Öcalan. A significant part of Kurdish public opinion criticizes this process on the axis of the Kurdish issue or finds it lacking; those who approach it with suspicion are met with responses like "If you're so pro-war, here are the mountains, the guns are waiting for you." How do you assess this process — do you support it?
Let me first state this clearly: supporting peace processes and advocating that national and social problems be resolved through political and peaceful means rather than violence is extremely valuable. The experiences of Ireland, Colombia, and South Africa are successful examples of this. My objection, therefore, is not to the idea of peace or to the decommissioning of weapons, but to what political project is being carried out under the name of "peace." For this reason, I see the process being conducted between Turkey and Abdullah Öcalan as a pseudo-peace process — that is, one that is outwardly peaceful but serves a different political goal. Looking at this process, I do not see a single indicator that would define it as peace.
In my view, the issue is not merely the PKK laying down arms; it is the removal of the Kurds in Turkey and the Middle East as an independent actor acting with its own political will and collective subjectivity. This is not limited to the Kurds in Northern Kurdistan; the Kurds in Rojava, Rojhilat, and Başûr are targeted by the same approach as well. Erdoğan said years ago, "We will not repeat the mistake we made in Iraq elsewhere." In other words, he views the status achieved in the South as a grave mistake. What is intended is for the Kurds to remain without status and defenseless — to become a structure that cannot stand on its own feet and is made dependent on the Turkish state. The statements of Devlet Bahçeli, Mehmet Uçum, and other state officials also show that the process cannot be understood solely within the framework of "disarmament" or "domestic peace." I read this process in the context of the reproduction of Neo-Ottomanism, Sunni Islamic brotherhood, and the imagination of the National Pact (Misak-ı Millî). Within this framework, there is a risk that Kurds will be positioned as a social element aligned with the Turkish state's regional interests, rather than being recognized as a separate political and national subject. At the same time, there is reason for concern about the restriction of the Kurds' emergence as an independent political actor in the Middle East and their development of their own regional alliances.
So how do you interpret those who find this process lacking or view it with suspicion being branded as "anti-peace"?
To establish the legitimacy of the process, besides state institutions, some Turkish journalists, academics, media outlets, and certain Kurdish political actors are also acting as coordinated discursive carriers. Kurds who voice legitimate concerns are accused of being "anti-peace," "nationalist," "self-serving," or "pro-war"; phrases like "If you're so pro-war, here are the mountains, the guns are waiting for you" are used. Yet in a genuine peace process, there must be a right to criticism and objection. The fact that Kurds who have paid heavy prices in the past approach the process with suspicion today does not mean they are pro-war; on the contrary, people who have lived through the cost of war have the right to speak on the conditions under which peace should be achieved. I also find it extremely problematic that certain Turkish circles, who describe themselves as leftist or democratic but mostly act like missionaries for the state, belittle Kurdish concerns and reproduce the political framework produced by the state. Moreover, these circles find support and representation in institutions that Kurds built at great cost, such as the DEM Party, İlke TV, and the Yeni Yaşam newspaper.
On the other hand, historical conditions must be distinguished from one another. We cannot explain the emergence of the PKK solely through the organization's ideology — which is what Öcalan and some Turkish officials are voicing today. The Turkish state's denialist, assimilationist, and colonialist policies were also decisive in creating this environment of violence. Many people who supported the Kurdish movement in the past did so not because they romanticized war, but because they saw no other option in a period when political avenues were largely closed off. In Frantz Fanon's terms, these were people who at one point took part in "legitimate violence," but who stood against violence once it was no longer necessary. Today, however, we are not in the same conditions: technology, communication, the diaspora, and the Kurds' regional political experience have changed considerably. I therefore do not believe that Kurds need to return to armed conflict today to defend their rights; on the contrary, I believe that the existing political and peaceful tools should be used far more forcefully.
What responsibility falls on Kurdish political actors in this picture? How do you assess their current stance on the ground?
A process that concerns the future of millions of Kurds cannot be assessed solely through the PKK's disarmament and the decisions Öcalan makes in prison. The Kurds' ethnic, political, and legal status, their position in the Middle East, and their right to determine their own future must also be discussed. For this reason, Kurdish political actors, at such a historic threshold, are obligated not to adapt to the current policy but to protect the long-term national interests of the Kurdish people, their right to be a political subject, and the future of their existence. Yet today, many Kurdish actors on the ground have entirely tied themselves to İmralı, largely losing their political will and initiative. There is a segment that adopts whatever Öcalan says without question, without making its own assessment or developing critical thought. Even more concerning is that they use an aggressive language — at times containing insults and threats — that is intolerant of those who criticize this line or put forward a different perspective. This situation creates a picture in which political thought and critical reasoning are weakened, something we might call "zombification." No political movement can build a healthy and democratic future in the long run by repeating what its leader says without question — especially when that leader is one who has been held hostage for 27 years and can only learn what is happening through information provided by the state...
In short, I strongly support peace and the end of violence. But I do not view the current process between Turkey and Öcalan as a democratic and genuine peace process. In my view, this process carries the risk of redefining and restricting the Kurds' political subjecthood, neutralizing their collective memory, and incorporating them into the Turkish state's regional hegemony project. I do not see the collapse in Rojava as separate from this framework either; I am seriously concerned that a similar approach may affect other Kurdish regions in the future.
Recently, some Kurdish politicians and media outlets aligned with them frequently cite Israel as an example when discussing the possibility of a future Kurdistan, using the terms "proto-Israel" and "post-Israel." What are these concepts, and why are they associated with Kurdistan? What kind of danger does this Israel comparison pose for the Kurds?
The association of the concepts "proto-Israel" and "post-Israel" with the Kurdistan issue is the product of an approach that reads the last century of the Middle East through an Israel-centered historical and geopolitical framework. In this approach, Israel is presented as the result of the order established in the region by Western powers, particularly British imperialism, and Kurdistan's future is described in terms of what came before and after this order. I find this reading both incomplete and, from a Kurdish strategic standpoint, dangerous.
Explaining the establishment of Israel merely as a project prepared by Britain or the Western powers oversimplifies historical reality. Behind the Balfour Declaration there were, of course, Britain's imperial and strategic interests. But in this process, the Zionist movement's own political organization, the decades-long efforts of Jewish communities, migration to Palestine, diplomatic activities, and ultimately the clashes with British administration were also decisive. Britain's severe restriction of Jewish immigration through the 1939 White Paper and its confrontation with the Zionist movement show that Israel cannot simply be explained as "a state founded by the British." Indeed, Israel's first prime minister, Ben-Gurion, described the British as an "invisible enemy."
The Cairo Conference is also important in this respect, because the British did not have a single, unchanging policy toward the Kurds from the outset. In 1921, while some British officials discussed keeping Kurdish regions separate from Iraq — even establishing an autonomous Kurdish structure that would serve as a buffer against Turkey — figures like Percy Cox advocated attaching Mosul and its surroundings to Iraq. In the end, the approach based on Iraq's territorial integrity prevailed, with the strategic and economic importance of Mosul and Kirkuk being decisive. But it is not enough to explain this process simply by saying "the British were enemies of the Kurds." The scattered and mutually conflicting political calculations of Kurdish actors, and their relations with regional powers — particularly the Turks — also affected the outcome. At that time, just as today, the Turkish side had a plan and policy in play. The example of Lieutenant Colonel Şefik Özdemir Bey, whom Atatürk sent under secret orders to organize Kurdish tribes in the region and mobilize them against the British, is a clear case in point. This covert operation, which went down in history as the "Özdemir Bey Operation" (or the Revandiz Operation), and the promises made to Kurdish leaders such as Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji, are clear indications of this.
Therefore, the historical record does not allow us to construct a simple causal link directly connecting the massacres or statelessness the Kurds suffered in the 20th century to Zionism, the Balfour Declaration, or a "proto-Israel" framework. There is not a single piece of evidence showing that Zionism was connected to massacres against the Kurds. Establishing such a link means rewriting history through conspiracy theories and prejudice. This, at its core, is antisemitism — that is, it feeds hostility toward Jews. Moreover, this approach obscures those actually responsible for the tragedies the Kurds experienced: it whitewashes the nationalist and centralist policies of the states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, established after the Ottoman collapse, and the line these states pursued against the Kurds. Of course, the decisions of international powers and the system have also had an effect on this picture. Attributing such a complex picture solely to the founding of Israel is both wrong and dangerous. Moreover, the Kurds' future cannot be written or built through the narrative of other powers.
What is this danger?
If Israel is coded in the eyes of the Kurds solely as "a Middle East project of foreign powers," and Kurdistan is also considered part of the same geopolitical scheme, then the Kurds' political will and historical subjectivity are pushed into the background. In this way, the right to self-determination is stripped of being a result of the Kurds' social and political demands and instead presented as part of a regional project of great powers. More importantly, a Kurdish political perspective built on opposition to Israel could narrow the Kurds' strategic room for maneuver in the region. It is not possible to consider the Kurds' future independently of their relations with Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria, as well as the United States, Europe, Israel, and other regional powers. For this reason, rather than placing their relationship with any actor into the category of enmity in advance, the Kurds should have an independent policy perspective that centers their own interests, security, and political goals. The "post-Israel" discourse, too, should be read not merely as a post-Israel Middle East order, but as a political project concerning how the Kurds will position themselves within this new order. My objection here is not to the Kurds establishing relations with Israel or criticizing Israel, but to turning the history of Israel's founding into a key that explains Kurdish history. This is an approach that is historically wrong and politically harmful for the Kurds.
In conclusion, the real danger for the Kurds is not Israel itself, but the Kurds defining their own political future through the geopolitical narratives of other powers. Lessons can be drawn from Israel's history, but Kurdistan's future cannot be designed as a copy of Israel. The Kurds need to develop an independent political perspective based on their own historical experiences, social will, and regional realities.
How do you assess the rapprochement Öcalan has developed with Turkey through opposition to Israel?
I believe that the rapprochement Öcalan has developed with the Turkish state through opposition to Israel could have very grave consequences for the Kurds. Turkey's military operations against Rojava, particularly until 2023, and the severe rights violations against Kurdish civilians in Northern Kurdistan, have created a deep memory within Kurdish society. Ignoring this memory to build a new political process on the basis of opposition to Israel could create a serious problem of trust and legitimacy. Öcalan implies that he is against Israel's regional hegemony. But how, then, are we to assess powers like Turkey and Iran, which target the Kurds' status and right to self-determination while also expanding their own regional influence? If Israel's regional influence is considered "hegemonic" or "imperialist," should not the same standard apply to Turkey and Iran as well? Today Turkey has growing political, economic, and military influence in many countries, including Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Qatar. Iran, for its part, had previously expanded its regional influence through Shia militias and political networks in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Therefore, for the Kurds, the issue is not merely criticizing Israel's policies, but being able to judge all powers in the region by the same standards.
Israel's regional policies certainly have aspects that can be criticized. But it is also unfair to define this policy solely as "an imperialist hegemony project." Israel has long positioned itself as a state facing security threats from Iran's regional network, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other armed actors; the Abraham Accords are one of the attempts to overcome this security and isolation problem through diplomatic and economic means. What the Kurds need to do is not to wholly adopt the discourse of any regional power, but to independently evaluate the policies of Turkey, Iran, Israel, the United States, and other actors in terms of their own national and democratic interests. The Kurds' future should be shaped by their own political will and strategic interests, not by hostility toward another state.
Recently there has also been talk of relations between the Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress, and the Zionists. Did the Zionists play a role in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the founding of the Republic of Turkey? If not, why is this claim voiced so often?
First of all, these concepts need to be distinguished from one another: the Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress, the Ottoman Jews, and the Zionist movement are not the same thing. There were contacts and political relations between them at various points; but it is not historically possible to conclude from this that "the Zionists brought down the Ottoman Empire" or "the Zionists founded the Republic of Turkey." The Young Turk and Committee of Union and Progress movements were, in essence, political movements involving people from different ethnic and religious groups, aimed at preventing the empire's disintegration and strengthening the central state. Zionism, on the other hand, was a separate movement that emerged at the end of the 19th century, aiming to establish a Jewish national homeland in Palestine.
The fact that some Jewish intellectuals and Zionists made contact with the Young Turks does not mean these movements were part of the same political project; there is a vast difference between making contact and jointly planning the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire's defeat and dismemberment in the First World War was the result of numerous factors, including the empire's internal problems, nationalist movements, the Balkan Wars, economic and military weaknesses, and the policies of the great powers. Explaining this entire process through Zionism would be a serious historical oversimplification. Likewise, there is no convincing evidence to support the claim that "the Zionists founded the Republic of Turkey." The founding of the Republic must be explained by considering together the nationalist movement in Anatolia, military and political cadres coming from the Ottoman army, local Müdafaa-i Hukuk (Defense of Rights) organizations, local forces such as the Kuva-yi Milliye, Kurdish tribes that gave support at varying levels, the genocide and demographic transformations experienced during and after the war, and the changing international conditions of the period.
So why is this claim raised so often?
One important reason is that there really were contacts between Jewish intellectuals, the Young Turks, and Zionists in the late Ottoman period. Real events — such as Abdülhamid II's meeting with Theodor Herzl, in which Abdülhamid rejected Herzl's request to establish a Jewish state in Palestine, or the presence of certain figures of Jewish origin within the Committee of Union and Progress — are later stripped of their context and used as if they were evidence of a much broader conspiracy narrative. Here, in particular, the concepts of "Jewish," "Zionist," "Salonican," and "Dönme" must not be conflated. A person being of Jewish origin does not automatically make them a Zionist; the presence of figures of Jewish origin within the Committee of Union and Progress does not mean the committee was Zionist. Indeed, figures of Jewish origin such as Emmanuel Karasu were part of the committee; but Karasu opposed the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine and advocated that Ottoman Jews remain Ottoman citizens. Similarly, many Jews in Britain and Germany at the time also kept their distance from the idea of a Zionist state, advocating "integration" into the society in which they lived. But after the Holocaust and the antisemitic persecutions in Europe, Herzl's thesis that "the security of the Jews can only be guaranteed by a permanent state" found much stronger resonance in the face of historical developments.
The core political goals of Zionism and the Unionist movement were also not the same. It would not be correct to say the Zionists had no political activity or contact during the Ottoman period at all; but there is not sufficient historical evidence, based on these contacts, to conclude that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire or the founding of the Republic of Turkey was a Zionist project. The real problem is the tendency to attribute a multi-actor, complex history to a single hidden center. Narratives such as "the Zionists brought down the Ottoman Empire," "the Zionists founded the Republic of Turkey," and then "Israel will found Kurdistan" form a mutually reinforcing conspiratorial framework. This approach causes the real political actors, social dynamics, and especially the Kurds' own historical subjectivity to become invisible. The correct approach for the Kurds is not to explain history through a single foreign power, but to examine separately what interests the Zionists, the Unionists, the British, the French, the Arabs, the Armenians, and the Kurds had, and in which periods they formed relations with one another. This moves us away from conspiracy theories toward a much more realistic understanding of history and politics.
In Öcalan's recent anti-Israel approach as well, historical readings based on conspiracy theories occasionally come to the fore; I do not see sufficient historical evidence to support them. It could be thought that a new political framework built on opposition to Israel and consideration of Turkey's security concerns might produce a rapprochement between Turkey and the Kurdish movement in the short term. But this approach could push the Kurds away from their own political demands and strategic interests in the long run. Turkey may be making certain concessions in the short term, or presenting the appearance of a new opening. But as long as concrete and lasting guarantees are not established regarding the Kurds' political status, security, and future, I believe such an approach carries the risk of making the Kurds more vulnerable and more dependent on Turkey's political will in the long term.
Alongside this process, which Turkey has launched on the basis of its security doctrine, we see a certain segment of Kurds adopting, together with Turkey, a serious anti-Israel policy and discourse. What is the reason for this?
I don't think there is a single reason for this. But recently, Turkey's security doctrine and the anti-Israel discourse of certain Kurdish circles aligned with Öcalan's line have clearly converged. In these circles, Israel is seen not merely as one party to the Palestinian issue, but as a power seeking to change the existing order of the Middle East and one that could use the Kurds in its own regional calculations. In Öcalan's recent approach, meanwhile, there is a growing tendency to address the resolution of the Kurdish question within a new political relationship to be built with Turkey, rather than through an independent state project or international alliances. This tendency can also intersect with Turkey's security concerns and its policies toward its regional rivals.
I am not against Kurds criticizing Israel. The problem is the identification of Kurdish political interests with Turkey's or another power's opposition to Israel. The Kurds today live within the borders of four different states, and I do not believe their political, legal, and cultural future is fully guaranteed in any of them. Chief among the elements threatening the Kurds' future are the policies of the centralist and, in various ways, increasingly authoritarian Turkish, Arab, and Persian states. Ignoring this reality and defining the strategic interests of all Kurds through a single "opposition to Israel" narrows the scope and the future of the Kurdish issue. Moreover, even though Jews have their own state, Israel is still under serious security threats; this too should not be forgotten. Criticizing Israel's regional influence while ignoring the political and military influence of Turkey and Iran in countries such as Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and Libya would amount to a one-sided reading of the region.
The correct approach for the Kurds is not to support or reject any state's policy in advance, but to evaluate each actor on the basis of its own interests and policies. For this reason, I do not view this anti-Israel orientation merely as a foreign policy preference; I believe it signifies a redefinition of the Öcalan movement's regional position. Becoming this intertwined with Turkey's security doctrine may produce a rapprochement in the short term, but in the long term it could narrow the Kurds' independent political room for maneuver and produce very dangerous consequences. What the Kurds need is not a new "opposition to Israel," but an independent regional strategy that centers their own interests.
In this interview, Veysi Dağ presented an academic framework for the skeptical voice rising within Kurdish public opinion regarding the Turkey-Öcalan process. His central point is this: what matters is not peace itself, but which political project is being implemented under the name of "peace." According to Dağ, the test of this process lies not in the silencing of weapons, but in the Kurds' capacity to exist with their own political will in Turkey and the region.
In the interview's second axis, the "proto-Israel/post-Israel" debate, Dağ argued that this narrative, which has recently gained strength in Kurdish politics, lacks a historical foundation and, moreover, could lead the Kurds to define their own issue in the shadow of another power.
In conclusion, Dağ's emphasis is clear: what the Kurds need is not a new opposition to Israel, but an independent regional strategy that centers their own interests.
As Rastî, we will continue to pursue this discussion with different voices.