Adile Hanım: Opposing Öcalan is not enough: Kurds need ideas

Rastinews — Perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of Kurdish politics is that for many years it has been unable to create its own opposition.

When we look at the nearly half-century history of the PKK, we see a powerful organization, large-scale social mobilization, heavy costs, rebellion, resistance and war. But within that same history, we do not see a strong tradition of opposition that became institutionalized, managed to preserve itself, and offered Kurdish society an alternative line of thought.

This is not a coincidence.

Throughout its history, the PKK did not struggle only against the Republic of Turkey. It also established a major hegemony over the Kurdish political space. The objections, splits, purges within the organization and the clashes with different Kurdish movements have been among the least discussed aspects of this history. It is also known that some of these reckonings ended in death.
It is not possible to speak of a new Kurdish politics without confronting this.

But today we face another danger:
Opposite a political culture that in the past left no room for criticism, an opposition is now forming that defines itself solely through opposition to Öcalan.

This is exactly where my objection begins.
Criticizing Öcalan is easy — what do you put in his place?
Follow the television channels, YouTube channels and social media over the past two years.

Kurds who approach the process called "Terror-Free Turkey" with suspicion have significant objections. I share some of these myself.

What is the legal basis of this process?

What will Kurds gain?

Once the PKK lays down its arms, will the Kurdish issue be considered resolved?

Does the state view the Kurdish issue as a matter of democratization and rights, or merely as the dissolution of the armed organization?

What will be the status of Kurds in Syria?

Will the SDF's integration into Damascus secure the Kurds' gains, or will it erode them over time?

Where will Turkey's military and political presence in Syria evolve to?

All of these are legitimate questions.

Attacking the people who ask these questions by calling them "warmongers," "opponents of peace," or "Kurdish nationalists" serves no purpose other than killing the debate.

But there is also a question that must be asked of the opposition here: so what is your proposal?

Going from one television program to another to recount Öcalan's mistakes does not give Kurds a political perspective. You can criticize Öcalan's readings of history.

You can reject his assessments of the Republic of Turkey. You can harshly criticize the PKK's past. You can also think that the new process will dismantle the Kurds' gains. All of this is open to debate.

But after saying all this, the same question still sits on the table: what do you propose?

Because the PKK is no longer the old PKK

There is a new reality that needs to be recognized.
The PKK has announced its dissolution. A process is underway toward withdrawing from armed struggle. As a result, the structure that has stood at the center of Kurdish politics for forty years is historically moving into another stage.
That being the case, the Kurdish opposition also needs to break out of its old habits of thought.

How will Kurdish politics be organized in a period when the PKK does not exist, or is no longer present as an armed actor? This is the real debate.

Because when a political movement bases its entire existence on the person it opposes, it unwittingly places that same person at the center of its own politics. Those loyal to Öcalan put Öcalan at the center of their politics. If Öcalan's opponents also build their entire politics around Öcalan, then in the end the same person sits at the political center of both sides.

So where, in this situation, is independent Kurdish thought?
This dependency has a cost — and it has been discussed very little until now.

I want to pause here and get to the real issue: why has it been so difficult for a political tradition to build its opposition on the basis of an "alternative" rather than "opposition" itself?

There is no easy explanation for this. But three reasons stand out.

First, during the forty years of armed struggle, the political space had effectively narrowed. State repression, the organization's internal discipline, and the urgency imposed by wartime conditions — all of these turned the production of independent thought into a luxury. While a people was fighting for survival, building institutional centers of thought was seen as a secondary matter. This is an understandable historical reality. But today it can no longer be an excuse.

Second, the Kurdish intellectual was long confined to the binary of "you're either with us or against us." A position trying to stand neither fully inside nor fully outside — critical but not disengaged — was made nearly impossible. Yet the strength of every social movement comes precisely from its need for intellectuals who stand "in between" like this and ask uncomfortable questions. As these voices were silenced, what remained was either total loyalty or total rejection — the middle ground emptied out.

Third, and perhaps the least discussed: independent institutions of thought need material and political security. A think tank, a research institute, an academic journal — these require structures that are long-lasting, have stable funding, and are relatively protected from political pressure.

The history of Kurdish politics has hardly allowed for such stability. But the diaspora now largely has the means to provide this stability, and this opportunity has not been sufficiently utilized until now.

These three reasons explain the past. They do not explain the present. Because today the conditions have changed.

Rojava is the hardest test of this

This is why what is happening in Syria today is so important.
Kurds fought against ISIS for years. Thousands of people lost their lives. Military, administrative and social institutions were established in North and East Syria.

Now a new period is being experienced. Damascus is trying to rebuild central authority. The Kurds' military and administrative structures are at the center of the integration debate. Turkey is trying to preserve its military and political influence in Syria.

So what are the Kurds' red lines? Where does the boundary of integration begin, and where does it end? What will be the status of education in Kurdish? What powers will local administrations have? How will the security mechanism in the Kurds' own regions be shaped? Will there be a constitutional guarantee, and if so, what form will it take?

Without answering these questions, saying "Öcalan sold out Rojava" is politically just as inadequate as saying "whatever Öcalan does is right."

Because neither sentence tells us what is to be done tomorrow morning.

This is exactly where the concrete value of an independent space for thought emerges: had there been an institution working on three or four different models for Rojava's constitutional status, comparing them, and presenting their pros and cons to the public, this debate today would be proceeding not at the level of "who is right and who is wrong" but at the level of "which model is more workable." The question itself would have changed.

Kurds need a new table

I now think that a different debate needs to begin.

There does not need to be a leader at the head of that table. In fact, there should not be.

The academic should sit at it. The journalist should sit at it. The student should sit at it. The worker should sit at it. The shopkeeper should sit at it. The housewife should sit at it. The religious Kurd should sit at it. The secular Kurd should sit at it. The socialist should sit at it. The nationalist should sit at it. The feminist should sit at it.

Someone coming from the PKK tradition should sit at it, and so should someone who has stood against the PKK their whole life.

The Kurd from Turkey should sit at it, the person from Rojava should sit at it, and the voice from Iraqi Kurdistan and the young person in the European diaspora should also be part of that debate.

They do not have to convince one another. But they do have to learn to speak without silencing one another. Because this is precisely what democratic politics is.
But this table will not come into being on its own.

It will not emerge from a call or a wish. It requires concrete steps:

Independently funded research institutes with no affiliation to any party should be established — just like the think tanks other peoples have set up to discuss their own national issues. These institutions should not be the mouthpiece of a single person or a single movement; on the contrary, there should be multiple centers that compete with and criticize one another. Because creating a single "unofficial authority" would be nothing more than continuing the old hegemony under a new name.

Kurdish academics working scattered across universities and the diaspora should be brought together. Today there are hundreds of academics around the world working on this subject, but there is next to no systematic connection between them, no shared publishing space, no common ground for debate.

Publications that appear in Kurdish and Turkish, independent of party lines, and either peer-reviewed or at least held to serious editorial standards, should be multiplied.

Today's media environment is shaped around either partisan media or state media; a third, critical and independent space barely exists.

Where are the Kurds' own think tanks?

From here, an even more uncomfortable question needs to be asked.

We are talking about millions of people.

We are talking about tens of thousands of university graduates, academics, lawyers, journalists, researchers, artists and politicians.

So where are the Kurds' independent think tanks?

Where are the institutions working on alternative constitutional models for Syria's future?

Where are the centers researching the unarmed phase of the Kurdish issue in Turkey?

Where are the academic studies comparing the world's models of autonomy, decentralized governance, federalism and minority rights?

Where is the political, economic and cultural perspective laying out the next twenty years for young Kurds?

Waiting for a leader's statement every time a crisis breaks out is not a political tradition. It is dependency.
And this dependency is not found only among those loyal to Öcalan. It continues in a different form among those who have turned opposition to Öcalan into a political identity. Because doing politics by constantly reacting to one person also means remaining bound to that person's agenda. He is still setting the agenda — this time from the negative side.

A third space is now needed

Kurds do not have to be squeezed between Öcalanism and opposition to Öcalan.

Beyond this, there is a large political space.
Critical but not denialist. Supporting peace but not applauding every text put in front of it. Advocating leaving armed struggle behind while knowing that the Kurdish issue does not disappear once the arms are laid down.

Not romanticizing Rojava, but wanting the gains achieved there to be protected. Defending coexistence in Turkey while saying this will not be possible without equality. A space that embraces Kurdish history while also being able to confront the mistakes within its own history.
This is what Kurds truly need. Not a new leader, but a new intellectual climate is needed.

This climate will not descend from the sky. It will be built. And building it requires much more than a call to action: patient institutional work, long-term funding, and a culture of debate that neither silences nor idealizes the other side.

Because if the coming period is to be the era of ideas rather than arms, Kurds need to prepare for it.

For forty years, politics was practiced in the shadow of armed struggle. There is no need for the next forty years to also pass in the shadow of a single person — whether in the form of loyalty or opposition.

Öcalan can be criticized. The PKK can be criticized. Barzani can be criticized. The DEM Party can be criticized. The Rojava administration can be criticized. All Kurdish political actors can be criticized.

But if, at the end of your criticism, you cannot put forward an idea of your own, it means you are merely revolving around someone else's politics.

What Kurds need today is not opposition but a vision of the future. And that vision is not built with a single article or a single call, but with institutions, continuity and patience.

Perhaps it is now time to change the question.
Not what will Öcalan do, but what will Kurds do — and with which institutions, on what ground, will they debate it?