Through World Examples: The 'New Solution Process' — Part 1

Rastinews — Commentary on the process under way in Turkey frequently invokes "world examples," arguing that the country should draw on other nations' experience in resolving similar conflicts. The subject comes up everywhere from academic and political presentations to parliamentary committees to media debates. Mustafa Karasu, a leader of the now-dissolved PKK, referred repeatedly to world examples in a statement dated May 5, 2026. He argued that the state had failed to apply the peacemaking methods used in those cases, while his own movement had moved at an unprecedented pace.

But which world examples are being cited? In how many of them was a lasting peace and settlement actually achieved, which ones failed, and which methods produced results? Answering those questions requires examining the historical background, the peace processes themselves, and the outcomes they produced.

The examples most often cited in these discussions are ETA, the IRA, the Tamil Tigers and FARC. Of the four, only FARC was not built directly on identity politics. ETA, the IRA and the Tamil movement all grew largely out of grievances over identity, belonging and political representation — respects in which they bear certain similarities to the Kurdish issue.

Identity-based grievances have driven armed conflict, civil war and prolonged political crisis in many parts of the world. The reason is not complicated. Once nation-states took shape, the majority nation that gave the state its name often moved to suppress, erase or assimilate other languages, cultures and beliefs — provoking, almost inevitably, a backlash. Policies of denial and forced assimilation have, over time, produced resistance, uprisings and, in some cases, armed struggle.

Examples from across the globe show a striking similarity in the repression and assimilation policies applied. That similar outcomes emerge in countries with vastly different histories and cultures is no coincidence. Even setting aside cases that never escalated into open conflict, the pattern is clearly not confined to any one region. Belgium, Canada and France have all seen periodic tension between central governments and regions with distinct languages and cultures. By contrast, countries that have largely resolved such disputes tend to share certain features: they raised democratic standards, built mechanisms for political representation, strengthened local government and expanded cultural rights.

Looking at the processes Turkey has pursued, past and present, no comprehensive approach has yet emerged that addresses the root causes of the problem. Just as notable is the absence of the sincere, transparent and realistic approach that produced results elsewhere. As the Sri Lankan case below will show, even that country's inadequate approach went further than anything seen in Turkey. Consider this: although Sri Lanka's process ultimately failed and the Tamil Tigers suffered a crushing military and political defeat, Tamil became one of the country's official languages and the Tamil region was granted partial autonomy.

It is worth briefly reviewing the historical background, peace processes and outcomes of ETA, FARC, the IRA and the Tamil Tigers. Covering every detail of each case is obviously beyond the scope of a single article, so we will sketch each in broad strokes.

THE ETA-BASQUE QUESTION

ETA was a left-wing organization that waged an armed campaign for the independence of Spain's Basque Country. The roots of the conflict reach back to the late 19th century. The same historical developments that fueled the rise of Basque nationalism later gave rise to ETA itself.

Spain's politics in this era were shaped by coups and instability. The Primo de Rivera dictatorship, which seized power in a 1923 coup, banned the use of Basque and Catalan. After Rivera's fall, socialists won the following elections and granted autonomy to Catalonia in 1932 and to the Basque Country in 1936. The decision to grant the Basques autonomy was also driven by a wish to secure their support ahead of the looming civil war.

General Francisco Franco launched the civil war, arguing that autonomy would tear Spain apart. The bombing that inspired Pablo Picasso's famous painting Guernica struck the Basque town of the same name. After Franco won the war, repression of Basque language and culture only intensified — and, rather than weakening Basque nationalism, it strengthened it. As in many other cases, repression and bans tend to produce the opposite of their intended effect.

Before ETA, the main political voice of Basque nationalism was the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). Though it had originally championed independence, the PNV gradually accepted an autonomy model, pushing pro-independence factions toward new organizations.

ETA grew out of student movements around the University of Bilbao and took its name in 1959. The group embraced armed struggle against the Spanish state, opening with railway sabotage before moving on to assassinations of security officials accused of torture.

Harsh crackdowns by the Franco government weakened the organization at times, but ETA survived and repeatedly regrouped. France's stance proved decisive here: for many years, Paris allowed ETA to organize and operate from French territory, a tolerance that did much to keep the group alive.

Campaigns against death sentences handed down to its jailed members drew international attention to ETA, and the group used the broader sensitivity toward capital punishment to build a degree of legitimacy.

At home, its attacks on senior figures of the Franco regime won it support in some quarters. The most notable of these was the assassination of Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, widely seen as the regime's second-most-powerful man.

Over time, though, ETA shifted its choice of targets, escalated its violence and began carrying out attacks that killed civilians as well. The shift steadily eroded the sympathy and support it had built up.

A 1974 bombing in Madrid that killed 11 civilians marked a turning point for ETA. The attack not only cost the group public support but also triggered serious splits within its ranks.

After Franco died in 1975, Spain entered a period of democratization. ETA nonetheless stepped up its armed campaign. The 1978 constitution created 17 autonomous regions across Spain, but the arrangement failed to satisfy Basque and Catalan nationalists.

During this period ETA conducted most of its political activity through Herri Batasuna, campaigning for the constitution's rejection in the referendum.

In 1983 the Spanish state set up an illegal paramilitary group, GAL (Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación), to fight ETA. GAL targeted ETA members and sympathizers, carrying out numerous illegal operations and extrajudicial killings.

Trials held years later convicted the interior minister of the time and the state minister responsible for security over their ties to GAL, confirming the state's role behind the group.

As with many armed organizations, ETA also attacked former members who left the group or chose to pursue democratic politics instead.

The most striking of these was the 1986 killing of former ETA member Dolores González Katarain in front of her child. The killing sparked outrage in Basque society and significantly eroded support for the group.

Similarly, an ETA attack on a shopping center in Barcelona that killed 21 people largely destroyed the sympathy the group held not only in the Basque Country but in Catalonia as well.

ETA and Spanish governments held secret talks at various points, and the group declared ceasefires from time to time as a result of these contacts.

The first known serious talks took place in Algeria in 1989 but produced no result. When ETA stepped up its attacks in the 1990s, large peace demonstrations were held across Spain. Mass protests in Madrid in particular made clear the public's stance against the armed struggle.

During this period, Spain focused on seeking international support against ETA, and received its most important backing from France.

Because part of the Basque region lies within France's borders, France's position proved decisive. Security cooperation between the two countries led French police to carry out successful operations against ETA's top leadership, seizing organizational documents and largely neutralizing the group's leadership.

These operations dealt ETA a severe blow, and the group never recovered its former strength.

ETA declared its final ceasefire on 5 September 2010, and in 2011 announced it was permanently ending its armed activities. In 2018, the group finally announced its dissolution.

This brought to a close a conflict that had lasted nearly half a century.

No comprehensive peace agreement was ever signed between ETA and the Spanish state. The group was never recognized as an official party at any stage.

ETA's insistence on armed struggle, and in particular its attacks targeting civilians, caused splits within the organization and eroded its public support. In the end, the group suffered both a political and a military defeat.

Spain, by contrast, underwent rapid democratization after Franco. Reforms launched under Adolfo Suárez, and autonomy arrangements later expanded under Zapatero, weakened many of the arguments underpinning separatist movements.

The expansion of cultural and political rights in regions such as the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, along with the strengthening of local governments and the recognition of regional identities, produced significant results.

In this process, meeting many demands short of independence significantly undercut the justifications ETA used to legitimize its violence.

In the same period, Spain enacted legislation allowing the closure of political parties with organic ties to groups that supported or carried out violence.

Under this legislation, a case was brought to ban Herri Batasuna, seen as ETA's political wing, and Spain's Supreme Court ordered the party's closure. An appeal against the ruling was later rejected by the European Court of Human Rights.

In the ETA case, the group's political and military defeat had two main causes. The first was its insistence on armed struggle and its resort to acts of terrorism that steadily eroded public support. The second was the steps Spain took toward democratization, strengthening local government and expanding cultural rights. In other words, security policies were applied on one hand while, on the other, many of the underlying causes fueling the conflict were removed.