Report: Demirtaş Release Expected in September; Ankara Debates Return of PKK Members From Europe
RastinewsAfter Turkey's parliament passed the framework law on PKK's disarmament process, attention has turned to implementation. Sources in Ankara say former HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş could be released as early as September, while a new debate has emerged over the return of PKK members living in Europe. According to Nefes columnist Nuray Babacan, Ankara does not intend to open the door to everyone: sidelining certain figures regarded as "hardliners" through an intermediate mechanism is under discussion.
As the National Solidarity and Social Integration Law — drafted as the legal basis for PKK's disarmament and dissolution process — passed the General Assembly of parliament, debate in Ankara over its political consequences entered a new phase.
One of the most critical issues in the process is the status of former HDP Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş, imprisoned since November 2016.
According to backstage information relayed by Nefes columnist Nuray Babacan, the DEM Party is said to have directly raised the Demirtaş issue in the ongoing talks.
DEM Party members reportedly told their Ankara interlocutors that leaving Demirtaş out of the new arrangement would create a serious political problem, particularly among Kurdish public opinion.
The essence of the objection voiced by the DEM Party is clear: if the framework law is to be presented as the legal start of a new era on the Kurdish issue, it will be hard to explain in Diyarbakır and among Kurdish voters why Demirtaş remains behind bars.
Ankara circles expect Demirtaş's release in September
But the most striking claim concerns Demirtaş's release.
According to Babacan, some circles in Ankara believe the necessary political will for Demirtaş's release has already formed.
Under the timeline circulating in Ankara, his release could come after the framework law takes effect, by September at the latest.
The critical question here is not so much whether Demirtaş will benefit directly from the framework law, but which legal mechanism his release would go through.
Babacan reports that the government is seen as having more than one option: the provisions of the new law on one hand, and the legal grounds established by Constitutional Court and European Court of Human Rights rulings on the other.
The debate in Ankara, then, is no longer just about whether Demirtaş falls under the framework law.
The real question is which legal door his release would pass through, should the political will materialize.
The second major issue: PKK members in Europe
One of the most complicated files surrounding the framework law is the status of PKK members living in Europe.
According to Babacan, the issue has stirred debate in Ankara as intense as that over the future of PKK members still in the mountains.
That is because a single, uniform policy toward everyone based in Europe is not being considered.
It was already known that Ankara had considered barring the return of certain senior figures based in Kandil. In an earlier column, Babacan reported that Sulaymaniyah had emerged as an option for roughly 200 senior figures who would never be allowed back into Turkey.
The latest information suggests the debate is not confined to the Kandil cadre and extends to the organization's structure in Europe as well.
Not everyone will be allowed back
According to Babacan's sources, easing the ban on return and political activity for PKK members living in Europe is possible.
But that would not mean everyone could automatically return to Turkey.
Sources describe plans for an "intermediate mechanism."
Under this mechanism, those wishing to return from Europe would reportedly have their cases assessed individually and undergo a form of screening.
In other words, even if the framework law opens a general legal door, a political and administrative filter on who may pass through it is under discussion.
This is where the most striking term in Babacan's column appears:
"Culling."
Claim: door will stay shut for "hardliners"
According to sources in Ankara, the state does not want the return of individuals it believes could disrupt the new non-conflict environment.
Certain figures based in Europe who keep their distance from the current process and insist on the old political line are said to be regarded as "hardliners."
Sources say these individuals are described in Ankara circles as "stuck in a time tunnel."
Ankara's approach, according to this account, is to build a controlled and selective return model after disarmament rather than an unrestricted return for all members of the organization.
How the legal line will be drawn between those allowed to return and those who are not remains unclear for now.
This could become one of the most contentious aspects of the law's implementation, since using individuals' political views or statements about the process as a criterion for granting the right of return could trigger legal and political disputes of its own.
Sulaymaniyah for Kandil, a filter for Europe
Read alongside the previously reported Kandil formula, Babacan's latest information suggests Ankara is working on a multi-layered plan.
Earlier reports indicated Turkey had considered sending roughly 200 senior PKK figures based in Kandil, whose return it does not want, to third countries.
But concern that sending them to European countries could allow them to build ties with foreign intelligence services was said to have pushed the Sulaymaniyah option to the fore.
Under this scenario, senior cadres would remain outside Turkey but live in a location where Ankara could keep closer watch over their activities.
The latest reports show a different model is under discussion for cadres in Europe:
Return to Turkey will not be closed off entirely, but the right of return will not apply equally to everyone.
Demirtaş remains the process's most sensitive point
Amid all these debates, Demirtaş remains the most politically symbolic case.
His status is not simply a matter of release or sentence enforcement; it is directly tied to how the government's new process will be read by Kurdish public opinion.
DEM Party circles' core objection appears to center on precisely this point.
On one hand, a new regulation could change the legal status of thousands of people as a result of PKK's disarmament; on the other, keeping one of the highest vote-getting Kurdish politicians in Turkey's history behind bars could raise questions about the political legitimacy of the process.
As a result, sources say the question circulating in Ankara is no longer whether Demirtaş will be released, but when and through what legal formula.
At this stage, though, it should be stressed that the September timeline is not an official decision but an expectation circulating informally.
Public reaction also factors into the government's calculations
Another important dimension of the reports Babacan relays is the government's electoral calculus.
According to this account, the AK Parti leadership plans to avoid regulations that could cause significant vote losses among its own base while still taking steps to keep the process moving.
The framework law's implementation is therefore expected to be managed not only legally but through a detailed political communication strategy as well.
Babacan reports that the government will launch a new public communication campaign to manage possible reactions in society.
The picture suggests that with the framework law's passage through parliament, the process's first phase has closed and the more difficult implementation period has begun.
From here on, the debate will no longer be about whether the law passes, but about who benefits, who is left out, and what legal criteria the state will use to draw that line.
Demirtaş's possible release, the future of senior cadres in Kandil, and the reported "culling" mechanism for PKK members in Europe stand as the process's three most critical issues facing Ankara in the coming weeks.
And if the September timeline circulating in Ankara holds, Demirtaş's release could become the most significant political threshold of the period following the framework law's passage.