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Şahap Eraslan: Respect for the Dead Is Where Humanity Begins

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Şahap Eraslan: Respect for the Dead Is Where Humanity Begins

RastinewsHumanity Begins With Burial

Being human, it seems, begins with burying our dead. In nature, a dead animal's body feeds other creatures and returns to the cycle of life. Humans break from that cycle symbolically — burying the dead, burning them, setting aside a place just for them. Perhaps the first great rupture in the natural order starts with burial.
Burial then becomes ritual. Mourning follows death; graves are built; memorial ceremonies are held. Culture itself rests on these rituals. Death rites vary across cultures, but respect for the dead, for the body, for the grave is one of humanity's oldest shared values.

Even enemies locked in brutal war have called truces to bury their dead. They grant each other, in death, a right they denied each other in life. Death marks a line that even enmity must not cross.
Respect for the dead is a sign of becoming human.

Respect for the Dead Is Where Humanity Begins…


Antigone and Grievability
Sophocles' tragedy Antigone tells the story of exactly this boundary being violated. King Creon forbids the burial of Polyneices, Oedipus's son, who had fought against him. He does not stop at punishing Polyneices in death — he strips him of the right to burial to destroy his dignity as well. Antigone defies the king's law to bury her brother, because for her, his right to burial outranks the state's command. By burying him, she tries to restore the human dignity that was taken from him.
Judith Butler, drawing on this same tragedy in Antigone's Claim, examines the links between grievability, kinship, social recognition and subjecthood. Whose death can be mourned, whose death is recognized, who is accepted as human — these questions are not separate from one another. Denying a person burial and mourning is also a way of denying their social existence and their right to be recognized.

Respect for the grave, then, is not only respect for the dead. It is also respect for the recognition of the person as a subject, for culture, for civilization itself.

Disrespect for the Dead: Inhumanity


Disrespect for the dead is not animal behavior — let's not be unfair to animals. It is inhumanity. It is a denial of culture, of civilization, of the values we built up through the process of becoming human.  I sometimes read about attacks on graves. I see hostility directed at the bones of the dead, at headstones, at memories. A person sets out to take revenge not only on a living enemy but on that enemy's corpse, attacking someone who, everyone knows, can no longer defend himself.


Respect for the Dead Is Where Humanity Begins…
Passing Judgment on the Dead

I remember what happened at the funeral of Aysel Tuğluk's mother — how even a person's right to bury her mother could be turned into an object of hostility.
It's a grim story. We are facing today the same thing Antigone defied thousands of years ago: power's urge to pass judgment even on the corpse of someone it considers an enemy. Berkin Elvan's mother being booed at a rally is not a minor matter — it is a rupture in civilization. When a society won't even let its dead rest in peace, it destroys not just graves but the cultural and moral values humanity built over thousands of years. What was said about Berkin Elvan after his death, in other words, was simply indecent…


Outsourcing Conscience


Looking at the persecution and injustice in Turkey, at this hostility toward the dead and their graves, and at society's indifference to it, we keep asking the same question: how can people be so without conscience?

Yet the very people we accuse of lacking conscience sometimes prove capable of great compassion. Erdoğan let a rally crowd boo Berkin Elvan's mother, yet he can weep over a child killed in Egypt. Turkish nationalists who are outraged by the persecution of Uyghur Turks may not show the same sensitivity toward the persecution of Kurds. People who cry over children's deaths in one place can justify the killing of children in another.


So are these people compassionate, or without conscience? Do they have a conscience or not?
I don't think the issue is simply whether conscience exists or not. The issue is where conscience is located, and whose suffering moves it to act.
Three linked mechanisms are at work here: the outsourcing of conscience, selective empathy, and the offloading of moral responsibility. Conscience is a moral judgment a person carries out within themselves. A person can judge not only others' conduct but their own. At the end of the day we think over what we've done, and when we've wronged someone we can feel guilt, shame or embarrassment. Conscience requires that a person be able to question themselves.
But some people hand this inner reasoning over to an outside authority. In place of their conscience they put their ideology, their state, their nation, their religion, or whatever values they hold sacred. They then decide what's right and wrong not by their own moral judgment but by the standards of the group they belong to.
That is exactly what I mean by the outsourcing of conscience.

When someone says "I'd do anything for my country," for instance, they may feel no need to question the wrongs committed in that country's name. Once someone is labeled a "terrorist," the injustices done to them may no longer register as injustice, because the victim has been placed outside the bounds of moral concern.  A similar mechanism can work through religion. A person can be deeply compassionate toward fellow believers while justifying persecution of people of another faith. Saying "our religion commands it" hands the moral responsibility for one's own conduct over to an outside authority.  The problem here is not religion or belonging to a community as such. The problem is letting these loyalties take the place of individual conscience.


Selective Empathy


Consider the crowd that watched people burn to death at Madımak. Some in that crowd might, on another day, have genuinely wept over a different child's death. They could show tenderness toward their own children, be shaken to the core by a loved one's suffering. But they showed no such sensitivity toward the suffering of the people burned at Madımak, because in their eyes those victims fell outside the bounds of moral solidarity. This is where selective empathy takes over. A person has not lost the capacity to feel another's pain altogether — but directs that capacity only toward certain people, certain identities, certain groups. Group loyalty decides whose pain is worth seeing and whose pain can be ignored. Butler's question returns here: whose death can be mourned?
The concept of collective narcissism helps explain this contradiction. In collective narcissism, a person glorifies the group they belong to and builds their own self-worth on that group's greatness. Criticism of the group can then feel like a personal attack. Seeing the wrongs the group has committed becomes, as a result, an experience that threatens one's own sense of self-worth.

Offloading Moral Responsibility

The third mechanism is offloading moral responsibility. Instead of owning the wrong they've done, a person loads it onto an authority. Saying "the state demands it," "the nation's interests require it," "our religion commands it," or "those were our orders" removes one's own act from moral scrutiny.
An important consequence of this mechanism is that it blocks the formation of guilt and a sense of guilt. Feeling guilty requires that a person judge their own act as wrong and accept responsibility for it. But someone who ties their conscience to an outside authority can remove what they've done from their own moral judgment altogether. When a person says "I am carrying out God's command," they can see themselves not as the agent of an evil act but as the executor of a sacred order. The same mechanism works when someone says "I did it for my country." Because the nation is held sacred, an act done in its name takes on a share of that sacredness. What matters then is not the act itself but the cause invoked for it.
A cause held sacred can sanctify even the evil done in its name.
In such cases a person may not merely feel no guilt — they may even take pride in the evil they've done. They see themselves not as a wrongdoer but as a virtuous person doing their duty, serving their nation, or obeying God's command.


Conscience Turned Inside Out


The absence of guilt here doesn't necessarily mean conscience is absent. Its standards have been swapped out. A person may feel guilty not for doing wrong but for defying an authority's orders. Harming another person may not trouble them at all, while disloyalty to their own group can produce intense guilt. Conscience's function is thus inverted: a person can feel guilty not for committing evil but for refusing to commit it. This may be the most dangerous outcome of outsourcing conscience, because conscience stops being an inner check that prevents evil and turns into a mechanism that legitimizes it instead. Conscience hasn't disappeared entirely here. Something more dangerous has happened: it has stopped being a universal moral judgment and been put into the service of group loyalty and authority.

Conscience's Real Test

But the real test of conscience is not the compassion we show people we love. It's our attitude toward the injustices suffered by people outside our group, people who don't share our views, even people we regard as enemies.
A person grieving for their own child, weeping over their own nation's suffering, or showing mercy toward their fellow believers doesn't by itself prove they have a conscience. These can just as easily be the product of strong feelings of belonging.  Conscience is the capacity, when necessary, to stand against our own group, our own ideology, our own beliefs, our own state. That is exactly what Antigone did in defying Creon's law.  Because conscience is not someone else telling us what's right — it's our ability to morally question even the things we ourselves believe are right.

Respect for the Dead and Conscience

Outsourcing conscience, selective empathy and offloading moral responsibility are three mechanisms that complete one another. In the first, a person ties their moral standard to an outside authority. In the second, they confine their compassion to certain people only. In the third, they avoid owning the responsibility for the wrong they've done.
Once these three combine, a person not only grows numb to others' suffering but also distances themselves from confronting the moral consequences of their own actions. No guilt may form at all, because the act was defined from the outset as sacred, necessary and justified.
In this way a person can think of themselves as compassionate while at the same time defending cruelty. This may be one of the most dangerous forms of evil: not that a person is unaware they are doing wrong, but that they see the wrong they do as a moral duty.

Respect for the Dead Is Where Humanity Begins…


A person who attacks a grave, blocks a funeral, or boos a mother in mourning usually sees himself not as someone without conscience but as someone doing his duty.
Respect for the dead is a mark of becoming human. Respect for the grave is respect not only for the dead but for the mourning of the living, for recognizing a person as a subject, and for civilization itself. Disrespect for the dead is a person bidding farewell to his own humanity.

The views expressed here are the author's own; they may or may not coincide with the editorial line of Rastinews. Rastinews is a free platform open to differing views.

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